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Abstract
This article argues that the theory of social representations can give valuable contributions 
to media research. It offers a new theory-based approach for studying how the media and 
citizens socially represent societal and political issues colouring our age, or some specific 
time period. Two fundamental communicative mechanisms – anchoring and objectification 
– are posited by the theory. These mechanisms, with a set of subcategories, are presented 
and it is shown how they can be used as conceptual analytical tools in empirical analysis. 
Concrete examples are given from a study on climate change and the media.
Keywords: social representations, media research, communicative mechanisms, anchoring, 
objectification, climate change
Introduction
The theory of social representations, first formulated by Serge Moscovici, has influenced 
researchers from varying disciplines, but is still quite unknown to media researchers. 
The aim with this article is to introduce the theory and its communicative concepts and 
make them useful for media studies. The theory offers a new approach for studying how 
the media and citizens construct societal and political issues colouring our age, or some 
specific time period. Examples will be given from studies of climate change and the 
media (Berglez, Olausson & Höijer 2009; Höijer 2010; Olausson 2010).
Shortly speaking, social representations are about processes of collective meaning-
making resulting in common cognitions which produce social bonds uniting societies, 
organisations and groups. It sets focus on phenomena that becomes subjected to debate, 
strong feelings, conflicts and ideological struggle, and changes the collective thinking in 
society. As a theory of communication it links society and individual, media and public. 
The theory is relevant for media-and communication research in several ways. It speci-
fies a number of communicative mechanisms explaining how ideas are communicated 
and transformed into what is perceived of as common sense. This touches the very heart 
of mediated communication – how the media naturalizes social thinking and generates 
collective cognition. The theory offers the possibility to develop a theoretically based 
model of analysis. This is exactly the aim with the present article.
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Historical Origin of the Concept 
There is a link between the concept of social representations and Durkheim’s concept 
“collective representations” which refers to common ways of conceiving, thinking about 
and evaluate social reality. 
According to Moscovici (2000) this concept by Durkheim is, however, too static 
in relation to how we should understand contemporary society. It does neither catch 
the dynamics of and changeable character, nor the variability and plurality of social 
cognitions of the age in which we now live, he claims. To include all this he therefore 
suggests the new concept “social representation”. As noted by Markova (2003: 121) 
social representations may even be considered as “thoughts in movement” developing 
through communication.
Moscovici studied the spread of psychoanalytic thinking by the media in the French 
society and the transformation into common sensical social representations (Moscovici 
2007/1961). Such representations of health and unhealthy are typical areas in which 
scientific knowledge has an important role. A contemporary issue of great significant is 
climate change in which we can observe how science, politics, mass media and everyday 
knowledge meet and new social representations emerge.
According to Moscovici (2000) also individuals contribute to the formation of social 
representations in the interplay between social structure and individual. In modern so-
cieties the individual has some autonomy and assimilating social representations may 
simultaneously modify them. Individuals are “set free” from traditional binding social 
structures such as family, social class, and religion, which earlier guided thinking and 
behaviour (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Giddens 1994). There is a greater degree of 
choice concerning alternative ways of living and of strategies for how to get there. As 
put by Moscovici:
[…] individuals are confronted with a great variety of specialized knowledge on 
the part of groups to which they belong. Each individual must make his selection 
at a veritable open market of representations. (Moscovici 1984a: 963) 
By giving the individual some room the theory of social representations avoids social 
determinism and opens for processes of transformation. But still the individual is mainly 
embedded in and formed by social structures.
With the epithet “social” Moscovici wants to emphasize how representations arise 
through social interaction and communication between individuals and groups. “Social” 
also marks that the contents of representations are social. They reflect, in different ways, 
historical, cultural and economic contexts, circumstances and practices. 
What are Social Representations? 
Social representations are about different types of collective cognitions, common sense 
or thought systems of societies or groups of people. They are always related to social, 
cultural and/or symbolic objects, they are representations of something. There is no clear-
cut definition used by the advocates, and Moscovici himself gives a number of definitions:
Social representations […] concern the contents of everyday thinking and the 
stock of ideas that give coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the 
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connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. They make it possible 
for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviours and to 
objectify them as part of our social setting. While representations are often to be 
located in the minds of men and women, they can just as often be found “in the 
world”, and as such examined separately. (Moscovici 1988: 214) 
A social representation is a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold 
function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate 
themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to 
enable communication to take place among members of a community by provid-
ing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying 
unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual group his-
tory. (Moscovici 1973: xiii) 
[…] from the dynamic point of view social representations appear as a “network” 
of ideas, metaphors and images, more or less loosely tied together. (Moscovici 
2000: 153)
Social representations are not to be seen as logical and coherent thought patterns. They 
may instead be full of thought fragments and contradictory ideas. With the concept 
cognitive polyfasia social representations theory refers to the fact that everyday think-
ing about something may be characterized by different, sometimes opposite, forms of 
thinking.
To deal with the tricky question of how collectively shared social cognitions must be 
to qualify as social representations, Moscovici makes a distinction between hegemonic 
representations, emancipated representations and polemic representations. Hegemonic 
representations are shared by most of the members of a political party, a nation, or 
other structured macro unit. They are uniform and ‘prevail in all symbolic or affective 
practices’ (Moscovici 1988: 221). In contemporary society climate change conceived of 
as a threat towards human life and society may be an example of hegemonic social rep-
resentations. Politicians generally agree that it is a severe problem, the media reporting 
is dominated by certainty about the existence of anthropogenic climate change (Olaus-
son 2009, 2010), and the public at large has adopted the same view (Berglez, Höijer & 
Olausson 2009). Emancipated representations relates to subgroups that create their own 
versions with “a certain degree of autonomy with respect to the interacting segments 
of society” (Moscovici 1988: 221). One example could be representations of health 
and illness in traditional and alternative medicine. These representations may partly be 
complementary and the public may pick up ideas of both and combine with their own 
experiences of health and illness. Polemic representations, at last, are related to social 
conflicts, struggles between groups, and controversies in a society. They are determined 
by “antagonistic relations” and “intended to be mutually exclusive” (Moscovici 1988: 
221), such as political ideas of liberalism and communism. The classification of social 
representations into these three categories is however, as much classification, somewhat 
vague, not least because ideas and social thinking is complex and often heterogeneous. 
As mentioned above social representations are multifaceted and may even be intrinsi-
cally contradictory.
What kind of collective cognitions does the theory of social representations have in 
mind? The following remarks may be made:
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1. Social representations refer to cognitions stamping the collective thinking of society. 
Of special interest are phenomena that in different ways diverge from traditional 
views, create tensions in society and challenge everyday life of citizens, groups and 
institutions. Such phenomena are especially well suited for studying how old ideas 
are modified and transformed and new social representations are produced by public 
debate. We easily find examples in today’s society, which go through many quick 
changes related to, for example, new communication technology, biotechnology, 
environmental risks, global market, terrorism and violence. 
2. As put by Moscovici (2000: 160) social representations “participate each time in the 
global vision a society establishes for itself”, and operates at different levels, includ-
ing large communities like the nation and small subgroups of people. We may here, 
as noted by Olausson (2010), see a connection to the concept of ideology, especially 
current theories concentrating on ideologies in the plural form, and as sense making 
practices of society and everyday life (Fairclough 1992; Hall 1986; 1995).
3. Social representations are complex and holistic. They may be seen as “theories”, 
“network of ideas”, metaphors and images that include emotions, attitudes and judge-
ments. They are, further, embedded in communicative practices, such as dialogues, 
debates, media discourses and scientific discourses (Marková 2003). 
4. Social representations refer to cognitions in communication, not least in public de-
bate. Moscovici (2007/1961) early on here emphasized the role of the media in the 
growth of new social representations, while Marková (2003) especially emphasizes 
dialogical communication in groups and between individuals. 
Communicative Mechanisms
Social representations theory specifies how collective cognitions are produced and 
transformed through communication with a focus on the socio-cognitive processes or 
mechanisms involved. On one hand all human interaction presupposes collective cogni-
tions, that is, social representations. On the other hand individuals and groups produces 
social representations through social interaction and communication. 
According to Moscovici (1984b: 7-10) there are two functions of representations. 
They conventionalize objects, persons and events we are meeting by giving them a 
specific form, localize them to a given category, and gradually establish them as distinct 
and shared cognitions. They are also prescriptive in the sense that they through social 
structures and traditions are forced upon us. Although we incorporate them into our in-
dividual minds, as individuals we rethink collective cognitions. It is important, however, 
to note that individuals and groups can rework and transform collective cognitions. The 
idea about a basic link between the collective and the individual, between the present and 
the past, and between the known and the unknown permeate the theory of social repre-
sentations. As Moscovici puts it about the relationship between the present and the past:
In many respects, the past is more real than the present. The peculiar power and 
clarity of representations – that is of social representations – derives from the 
success with which they control the reality of today through that of yesterday. 
(Moscovici 1984b: 10)
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All representations aim to “make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” 
(Moscovici 1984b: 24). The theory proclaims two basic socio-cognitive communicative 
mechanisms that generate social representations: anchoring and objectifying. The first 
mechanism, anchoring, makes the unknown known by bringing it into a well-known 
sphere of earlier social representations so that we may compare and interpret it. The 
second mechanism, objectifying, makes the unknown known by transforming it into 
something concrete we may perceive and touch and thus control. These mechanisms 
will be presented more thoroughly below.
Anchoring
By communication social representations are anchored again and again in other social 
representations. This is a kind of cultural assimilation by which new social representa-
tions are incorporated into the well-known ones simultaneously as the latter ones are 
transformed by the new ones. Gradually then the unfamiliar ideas become well-known 
ideas and part of the collective frames of references of a society. In short anchoring 
means that new ideas or phenomenon are related to a well-known phenomenon or con-
text. Stuart Hall is touching upon such a mechanism in his classical work “Encoding 
and decoding in the television discourse”.
New, problematic or troubling events, which breach our expectancies and run 
counter to our “common-sense constructs”, to our “taken-for-granted” knowledge 
of social structures, must be assigned to their discursive domains before they can 
be said to “make sense”. The most common way of “mapping” them is to assign 
the new within some domain or other of the existing “maps of problematic social 
reality”. (Hall 1973/1999: 57)
Hall’s “common-sense construct” and “taken-for-granted knowledge” in the quote 
above are close to the concept of social representation, and the “mapping” mechanism 
he describes is basically an anchoring mechanism by which something new is attached 
to something already known. He however does not dwell any further into this as done 
within social representations theory.
We may here differentiate between a number of anchoring mechanisms: naming, 
emotional anchoring, thematic anchoring, metaphoric anchoring and anchoring via 
basic antinomies.
Naming
A most common way of giving the foreign or unknown phenomenon a more well-known 
face is to name it. By naming something, “we extricate it from a disturbing anonymity 
to endow it with a genealogy and to include it in a complex of specific words, to locate 
it, in fact, in the identity matrix of our culture” (Moscovici 2000: 46). In this way the 
phenomenon is liberated from secrecy and incomprehensibility. A new political group 
may be named as terrorists, a new ill-health is called the Black Death of our age, the 
complex scientific phenomenon climate change may shortly be labelled as the weather, 
and so on. 
Naming often appears in headlines and introductions in the media, and even a vague 
naming may liberate the unknown from total incomprehensibility. In a series of articles 
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about climate change of a Swedish tabloid the complex phenomenon simply was named 
as “climate threat”, “weather”, “weather alarm”, or “the catastrophe” (Aftonbladet 
061101-061130). A British newspaper named a pro-vegan campaign focusing meat 
eaters’ role in causing global warming as “hot campaign” (headline: “Heather Mills 
launches HOT! Campaign” Guardian.co.uk, November 19, 2007). 
These acts of namings forge the abstract issue of climate change into recognizable 
frames of references, or as Moscovici (2000: 46) puts it, locate it in the identity matrix 
of our culture. Weather is a most common topic of everyday small talk, a lot of people 
are documenting their own weather observations in diaries, and the weather inevitably 
affects everyday life. It is everybody’s concern. And we do not want the weather to be 
too hot, or too cold, or too stormy, etc. Words as “threat”, “alarm”, “hot” or “catastrophe” 
brings in a dramatic dimension and anchors the issue in well-known media discourses of 
threat, catastrophe and alarm reports. A number of studies have confirmed that the media 
increasingly supply their audiences with such reports (Altheide 2002; Robertson 2001). 
With his special interest in science and everyday thinking, Moscovici argues that 
naming is necessary to as well thinking and communication as to social cooperation in 
a society, and he insists that naming neither should be seen as biasing or diminishing 
of the original object or phenomenon. Instead he points out that naming may enrich the 
object and give it new dimensions and qualities (Moscovici 2000). 
Classifying and naming sometimes may, however, as Lippman (1998/1922) once 
noted be strongly connected to processes of stereotyping. Naming someone as a for-
eigner, a deviant or a fundamentalist, or naming a behaviour an act of madness or a terror 
attack are not neutral classifications. To put it in the wordings of Lippman (1998/1922: 
119) such namings rather are “loaded with preferences, suffused with affection or dis-
like”. Stereotyping is specifically related to the naming of social groups and to questions 
of inclusion and exclusion, discrimination, power and domination (Pickering 2001). 
Stereotyping “creates the illusion of precision in defining and evaluating other people”, 
and “they are then fixed into marginal positions or subordinate status and judged ac-
cordingly” (Pickering 2001: 5).
Stereotypical naming is doubly fraudulent. Firstly, the “Other” is attributed taken for 
granted negative characteristics, which we conceive as naturalized. The naming therefore 
give an illusion of being realistic, that is, we do not see them as social constructions. It 
is so. Secondly, stereotypical namings confirm themselves when, as they are, used over 
and over again. It really is so.
Emotional Anchoring
Emotional anchoring is an attachment mechanism that is not specifically pointed out in 
the theory of social representations although Moscovici now and then addresses emo-
tions. For example in his writings about social representations of money he brings in 
emotions of passions and desire (Moscovici 1993). Also in Jodelet’s (1991) work on 
madness emotional aspects are discussed, and Joffe (2002: 568-569) argues for that 
social representations theory “keeps a space for symbols, infused with an emotional 
valence. It is emotion that motivates the formation of particular SRs [social representa-
tions]”. Explicitly, however, very little has been written about the role of emotions. This 
fact ha also been noted by Joffe (2002: 569): “the role of emotion has received surpris-
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ingly little attention “. I will here argue for the need to more explicitly take emotions 
into consideration in social representations theory. Emotional anchoring then refers to 
a communicative process by which a new phenomenon is fastened to well-known emo-
tions. By this the unknown gets recognizable as, for example, a threat or a danger to fear, 
something to worry for, or as something nice and pleasurable. As shown by psychologi-
cal research emotions may help us to interpret and judge social situations and objects 
(Bless, Fiedler & Struck 2004). The mass media willingly exploit this, often maybe in 
superficial and speculative ways. Social phenomena, events or courses of events are 
anchored in feelings of fear or an approaching threat, or in feelings of anger, pity or 
compassion. According to Furedi (2006: xiii) the increasing stream of scare stories in the 
media are even transforming Western culture into a culture of fear in which “fear feeds 
on itself and creates the disposition to speculate about other hazards lurking around the 
corner”. Climate change has found to be anchored by the media in a mixture of well-
known emotions of fear, hope, guilt, compassion and nostalgia (Höijer 2010). By this 
is the scientific phenomenon of climate change turned into a social representation we 
can compare with other current social phenomena attached to similar emotions such as 
terrorism or a number of environmental risks. The study concluded: “in short we may 
regard climate change as something to collectively fear, but there is hope if we behave 
in a climate friendly fashion. If we do not, we should feel guilt. Media further invites 
us to feel compassion for endangered species and nostalgia for the idyllic past we are 
about to lose” (Höijer 2010). 
Emotional anchoring may be embedded in the language used, and/or in the photo-
graphic pictures or illustrations. The example below illustrates how a tabloid news paper 
by explicitly putting blame on the individual who does not behave climate friendly an-
chored climate change in emotions of individual and collective guilt. Guilt is a socially 
constructed emotion and concerns violations of social codes and norms (Giddens 1991), 
in this case an implicitly proclaimed code of avoiding Brazilian meat, cacao and soap.
You are eating up the forest … Have you bought Brazilian meat or cocoa? There 
is a large risk that you are contributing to climate change. … Swedish consum-
ers could be supporting the destruction of the rain forest when they buy popular 
Brazilian meat, cocoa or soap. (Aftonbladet 061110)
Emotionally anchoring may be related to other forms of anchoring or to processes of 
objectifications (see below). For example, naming climate change as “climate threat”, 
or talking about biotechnology in terms of pollution metaphors (Levidow 2000) anchor 
these phenomena in emotions of fear and anxiety.
Thematic Anchoring
Anchoring may also take place at more basic thematic levels by the use of underlying 
categories of meaning, antinomies such as life/death or culture/nature etc., or by the 
use of metaphors. 
Moscovici (2000; 2001) uses the concept of theme to catch the structural in-depth 
levels of social representations. He argues that underlying collective, general patterns 
of thinking or primary ideas in interplay with specific contexts generates and structures 
new social representations. These so called themes, or themata in plural (Markova 2003; 
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Moscovici 2000), are in themselves socially and culturally constructed and maintained 
by social processes. According to Moscovici (2000: 163) they “have been created by 
society and remained preserved by society”. Since themes “never reveal themselves 
clearly” (Moscovici 2000: 182) the analysis of talk, interviews, or media products often 
must move beyond the specific language and visuals used. 
Themes may be conceived of in ways that come close to the concept of ideology 
regarded as common sense thinking or taken-for-granted ideas in a society or among 
groups (cf., Billig 1991; van Dijk 1998) for example democracy, human rights or 
equality (Moscovici 2001). A number of such underlying themes may be identified in 
analyses of the media. Continuing with examples from climate change a study found 
that individualization and nationalization were two prominent themes, (in the referred 
study also labelled ideological horizons), in Swedish news media (Berglez, Höijer & 
Olausson 2009). The following example shows how the theme of self-glorification 
nationalism takes place in the reporting on climate change. The glorification is present 
in wordings such as “the one country in the world” and “if we cannot make it, nobody 
else probably will”: 
Sweden is perhaps the one country in the world that most easily can get rid of its 
oil dependency. … If we cannot make it, nobody else probably will! We have the 
chance to prove that it is possible. (Aftonbladet 061102)
Themes may also be assigned to more universal ideas inscribed into language (Moscovici 
2000). Taking this as her starting point Markova (2003) has developed the concept of 
theme from the ontological position of a dialectical or dialogical human consciousness 
based on the ability to imagine and communicate with the Other. 
Anchoring in Antinomies
Dialogicality means, according to Markova (2003), that sense making is founded on a 
capacity to make distinctions, to think in oppositions, polarities, or antinomies. Similar 
to this Billig (1993) claims that human thinking is based on capacity to negate: accept 
versus turn away, justify versus criticize, etc. This creates tensions and dynamics in 
society, which may lead to change and development. In all societies antinomies such 
as life/death, human being/nature, we/them, fear/hope, freedom/oppression, and so on 
exists. 
In specific socio-historical contexts antinomies related to a social phenomenon may 
become a source of tension, conflict or problem and the phenomenon part of public 
debate. It is in such situations that new social representations are developed, according 
to Markova (2003). 
Analysing oppositional distinctions or antinomies thus turns focus to intrinsic ten-
sions, which may be especially marked in periods when new social representations 
develop. Taking social representations of climate change as a case, antinomies such 
as certainty/uncertainty, threat/hope, guilty/not guilty, nature/culture, global/local may 
organize the discourse (Höijer 2008; Olausson 2010). For example the distinction guilty/
not guilty was reflected over and over again in the reporting on climate change of a 
Swedish tabloid newspaper (Höijer 2010). The grown-up world was presented as guilty, 
in principle all adults in the West: “If everyone lived as we do in the West it would take 
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five planets to maintain our consumption of natural resources” (Aftonbladet 061116 ), 
while the innocent ones were children and animals: “What do you tell your sons, three 
and five years old, about the climate threat?” (Aftonbladet, 061110); “The baby walrus 
draws its final breath … a victim of climate change in the Arctic Ocean” (Aftonbladet, 
061108). Olausson (2010) found that underlying Swedish media further was an antinomy 
or oppositional distinction between us/them. In her discussion of how a European iden-
tity is constructed in news media on climate change she suggests that this is established:
by means of the depiction of a conflictual relationship between “Us”, the EU, who 
acknowledge climate change as a serious threat and want to take action against it, 
and “Them”, the USA, who refuse to even discuss regulations. (Olausson 2010) 
The relationship between themes and antinomies is somewhat unclear in the theory. 
Moscovici (2000) considers themes as “basic ideas”, “pre-existing thought”, or 
“primary ideas” while according to Markova (2003) antinomies are more basic also 
underlying themes. This makes sense if we for example think about ideological themes 
such as nationalism or individualism, which are hard to conceive of without the coun-
terparts of internationalism or collectivism. In analysing a specific discourse, however, 
anchoring a social issue in a specific theme (e.g. individualism) may dominate the dis-
course and its counterpart (collectivism) may be discursively absent. If we emphasize 
the concrete communication practices thematic anchoring may occur without anchoring 
in antinomies.
It is worth noting also that anchoring in antinomies may appear without thematic 
anchoring since “not all antinomies of thinking become themata” (Markova 2003: 184). 
Anchoring by Methaphors
Metaphors make things and phenomena comprehensible by imagining them as something 
else, for example “life is a journey” or “time is money”. A study on social representations 
of the EU found that people used metaphors such as “milk lakes” and “butter mountains”, 
originating from the media, when referring to food surpluses within the EU (Wagner & 
Hayes 2005). The media reports on “human shields” in wars and conflicts, “war” and 
“sport” metaphors are common in news reporting on many topics, etc.
Some metaphors are universal while many others reflect cultural variations (Kövecses 
2005), and there may also exist even more specifically situated metaphors. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) everyday language is permeated with metaphors. They even 
claim that all thinking and communicating basically is metaphoric.
There is great variety of metaphors and many attempts to classifications have been 
made. According to Ritchie (2006) some metaphors are more everyday-like (busy as 
a bee), other poetical (life is a dream), some complex with various meanings (life is a 
struggle), still others more one-dimensional (the party got out of hand). Root metaphors 
are those long-lived metaphors permeating cultures, for example conduit, contain and 
war metaphors (Kövecses 2005). St.Clair (2002) notes that growth-metaphors, play-
metaphors, drama-metaphors, machine-metaphor, and time- and room-metaphors for a 
long time have stamped European thinking. 
Anchoring social phenomena in metaphors may serve ideological and legitimating 
functions. Stibbe (2001) found that metaphors of war and of forest fire dominated Brit-
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ish media reporting on the mad-cow disease and that this justified drastic measures to 
be taken. Illness and death were two close metaphors in the media reporting on climate 
change (Höijer 2008). The planet was repeatedly described as “sick” on its way to 
“die” and a number of animals were about to be “killed” by the climate change. These 
metaphors not only underline the seriousness of the issue but also relate to our own 
existential anxiety and, in the specific media context studied, legitimated individual 
acting to mitigate carbon dioxide. 
Objectification
Objectification makes the unknown known by transforming it into something concrete 
we may perceive and experience with our senses. It is a kind of materialisation of ab-
stract ideas, which sometimes occur not least in the media, by representing the ideas as 
concrete phenomena existing in the physical world. “What is perceived replaces what is 
conceived”, writes Moscovici (2000: 51). When, for example, the media attach specific 
storms, heat waves or floods to climate change the abstract phenomenon is objectified. 
In science, climate change is an abstract, long-term phenomenon of statistical character, 
that is, based on probability calculus, which is difficult to grasp experientially. More 
frequent storms, intensive heat waves, etc., may certainly follow as a result of global 
warming, but as pointed out by Edwards (2001: 33) “the inherent variability of weather 
makes it impossible to attribute individual storms, floods, droughts or hurricanes to 
changes in the global climate”. 
Objectifying is, according to Moscovici (2000) a much more active process than 
anchoring which occurs almost automatically each time we are confronted with new 
phenomena. Objectifying, that is turning an unfamiliar idea into concrete reality requires 
more effort. Moscovici’s (2007/1961) own research on the spread of psychoanalytic 
thinking in French society is essentially a study of how the abstract and relational con-
cepts of psychoanalysis – the unconscious, ego, libido, complexes, neuroses, etc. – is 
objectified into concrete elements in public thinking. Going back to our climate change 
example objectification occurs when ordinary signs in the nature as a summer heat, an 
autumn storm, or a short winter are regarded as concrete anecdotal evidence of climate 
change. A new complex and abstract phenomenon is thereby materialised into familiar 
frames of references and transformed into everyday common sense. That people conflate 
weather and climate change has been shown in different studies (see Bostrom & Lashof 
2007). Weather, “the state of the atmosphere at a definite time and place with respect 
to heat or cold, wetness or dryness, calm or storm, clearness or cloudiness” (Bostrom, 
et al. 1994) replaces climate, “the average course or condition of the weather at a par-
ticular place over a period of many years, as exhibited in absolute extremes, means, 
and frequencies of given departures from these means, of temperature, wind, velocity, 
precipitation, and other weather elements” (Bostrom, et al. 1994). 
Objectification also appears in the media when scientific concepts are transformed 
into pictures which rather than the original thoughts and ideas become elements of the 
phenomena. Some years ago, when cloning was on the agenda in the public sphere, 
media published pictures of “Dolly the sheep” that became an objectification of modern 
biotechnology or genetic engineering (Bauer & Gaskell 1999). She was the first mammal 
to be cloned. Today newspapers expose photographs of retreating glaciers, melting polar 
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ice, polar bears and flooding illustrating the consequences of climate change (Smith & 
Joffe 2009). That these images objectifies climate change is further shown by the fact 
that melting glaciers and polar ice, that is, concrete visual objects, are the single larg-
est categories of free associations by the public when confronted with the word global 
warming (Leiserowitz 2007).  
Emotional Objectification
We may talk about emotional objectification when there is a strong emotional component 
involved, for example when concrete and frightening images such as people escaping 
severe floods, dead cattle on parched soil, or dramatic forest fires are repeatedly used 
by the media in the reporting of climate change (see Höijer 2010; Smith & Joffe 2009). 
One should remember that events like this always appear also without climate change, 
and that it is not these events per se that constitute global warming (see above). 
“To objectify is to discover the iconic quality of an imprecise idea or being, to repro-
duce a concept in an image”, writes Moscovici further (1984b: 38), and some visuals 
in the media may through a process of emotional objectification become icons of more 
abstract issues. Studies show, for example, that pictures of animals appealing to emo-
tions of compassion, such as sweet and cuddly polar bears on melting ice or young arctic 
foxes are common in the media reporting of climate change (Höijer 2010; Smith & Joffe 
2009). According to O’Neill and Hulme (in press) polar bears are now the most well 
understood icon of climate change by the public that is drawn to this image by empathy. 
In the media these wild predatory animals are conceptualized as innocent victims of 
climate change by beautiful images of mother and cub, lonely polar bears on a small 
ice floes or struggling to swim to safety. Their furs are pure and white as to underline 
their innocence. Alternative pictures of polar bears attacking seals and tearing them into 
eatable pieces would never objectify climate change in the same way.
Personification
In objectification through personification an idea or phenomenon is linked to specific 
persons such as when Freud personifies psychoanalysis or Gandhi political struggle 
through non-violence. To attach something to well-known public persons is a common 
discursive mechanism in the media in order to draw attention and popularise courses 
of events. In the case of climate change we can see how the media draw on familiar 
domestic meteorologists, key political figures, and celebrities. Smith and Joffe (2009), 
for example, found that photographs of the former Vice-President Al Gore regularly 
were accompanying news articles on climate change in the press. He was presented as 
an ambassador of the climate change and personified not only this issue but also interna-
tional efforts to solve the problem. Similarly celebrities and popular meteorologists are 
frequently used as spokesmen for the issue and often represented in ways that personify 
climate-friendly behaviour (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson 2009; Smith & Joffe 2009). 
As persons they gradually come to materialize or objectify the complex phenomenon 
of climate change with its relations to nature and human and political life in general. In 
the end we need only to say, for example, Al Gore, to get people to think about climate 
change. To this contribute of course also his film “An Inconvenient Truth”. 
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Discussion
The focus on representations of [new] societal phenomena and communication makes 
the theory of social representations highly relevant for media studies. This article has 
presented, and partly also developed, the basic ideas of the theory, more precisely the 
communicative mechanisms of anchoring and objectification. It could be noted that a 
theory here is understood in its deeper sense, that is as “both an approach, a way of 
looking at social phenomena, and a system describing and explaining them” (Moscovici 
1988: 212-213). It could also be noted that in the literature on social representations 
there are “relatively little guidance on the implications of the theory for the design of 
empirical research” (Bauer & Gaskell 1999: 163). Empirically a wide range of methods 
– both quantitative and qualitative – have been used in social representations research. 
The point here has not been, however, to discuss specific choices of methods but rather 
to emphasize the conceptual analytical level and link it to empirical application, in this 
case by concrete examples from studies of the media and climate change. One of the 
advantages certainly is that the theory offers the possibility to develop a tight relationship 
between the theoretical and empirical levels. Another advantage is the comprehensive-
ness of the theory including a number of communicative mechanisms at different levels 
of meaning making. For example, the conceptual richness of the concepts of anchoring 
and objectification in the theory makes it possible to analyze also more hidden levels 
of the social construction of meaning. In one study Olausson (2010) by focusing on 
antinomies, emotional anchoring and objectification in a detailed analysis uncovered 
a concealed but emerging European identity in the media reporting on climate change.
The theory of social representations directs attention to social and cultural thinking of 
society, how new social cognitions or representations of reality are pushed forward and 
old ones transformed through communication. The theory benevolent demystifies the 
question of where the representations come from. They are on one hand related to real 
changes in the material and symbolic world (technological changes, scientific achieve-
ments, courses of events, etc.) and on the other hand to the already existing bodies of 
social representations in social life, in the media and elsewhere in society. 
As with other theories there are, of course also shortcomings with this theoretical 
approach. Vorlklein and Howarth (2005) have, for example pointed out that questions 
of power relations are absent in the theory: “We need to analyse how representations 
may be infused with ideological power to justify status quo and so maintain systems of 
inequality and exclusion” (ibid: 446). Moscovici does, however, in general terms write 
about the power of ideas: “it is a proven truth that an idea, no matter what form it as-
sumes, has the power of making us come together, of making us modify our feelings and 
modes of behaviour and of exercising a constraint over us just as much as any external 
condition” (Moscovici 1993: 115). Theoretically though the power and ideology aspects 
certainly need to be developed, for example by combining social representations theory 
and critical discourse theory.
Another shortcoming, which has been put forth, is that the theory does not address 
the practices and activities of people or groups of people when they are producing 
social representations (Potter & Edwards 1999). Whether or not this is a serious limita-
tion is open for discussion but a theory can of natural reasons not include everything. 
Furthermore, Voelklein and Howarth (2005) point out that this critique is based on a 
view that characterizes cognition and action as oppositional but that social representa-
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tions theorists see no such dichotomy. The social and the individual, the cognitive and 
the cultural, mind and society constitute functional units and social representations are 
manifested in any social practice.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings the theory of social representations can give 
valuable contributions to media research. By studying how the media and the public 
anchor and objectify “new” scientific, political and social issues we obtain knowledge 
about vital transformations in the thought-systems or collective meaning-making of 
societies. Ongoing changes are not only structural material processes but also deeply 
emotional and socio-cognitive. 
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